Abstract. We study the computational power of iterative combinatorial auctions. Most existing iterative combinatorial auctions are based on repeatedly suggesting prices for bundles of items and querying the bidders for their "demand" under these prices. We prove several results regarding such auctions that use a polynomial number of demand queries: (1) that such auctions can simulate several other natural types of queries; (2) that they can approximate the optimal allocation as well as generally possible using polynomial communication or computation, while weaker types of queries cannot do so; (3) that such auctions that use only item prices may solve allocation problems in communication cost that is exponentially lower than the cost incurred by auctions that use prices for bundles. For the latter result, we initiate the study of how prices of bundles can be represented when they are not linear and show that the "default" representation has severe limitations. Our results hold for any series of demand queries with polynomial length, without any additional restrictions on the queries (e.g., to ascending prices).
simply declare their preferences to the mechanism are only practical for very small auction sizes or for very limited families of bidder preferences. (Note, however, that some clever designs of expressive combinatorial auctions work well in several real-world settings; see, for example, the survey [45] .) We have therefore seen a multitude of suggested "iterative auctions" in which the auction protocol repeatedly interacts with the different bidders, aiming to adaptively elicit enough information about the bidders' preferences so as to be able to find a good (optimal or close to optimal) allocation.
Most of the suggested iterative auctions proceed by maintaining temporary prices for the bundles of items, repeatedly querying the bidders as to their preferences between the bundles under the current set of prices, and then updating the set of bundle prices according to the replies received (e.g., [27, 14, 24, 41, 1] ). Effectively, such an iterative auction accesses the bidders' preferences by repeatedly making the following type of demand query to bidders: "Query to bidder i: a vector of bundle prices p = {p(S)} S⊆M ; Answer: a bundle of items S ⊆ M that maximizes v i (S) − p(S)." These types of queries are very natural in an economic setting, as they capture the "revealed preferences" of the bidders. Some auctions, called item-price or linear-price auctions, specify a price p i for each item, and the price of any given bundle S is always linear p(S) = i∈S p i . Other auctions, called bundle-price auctions, allow specifying arbitrary (nonlinear) prices p(S) for bundles.
In this paper, we offer a systematic analysis of the computational power of iterative auctions that are based on demand queries. We do not aim to present auctions for practical use but rather to understand the limitations and possibilities of these kinds of auctions. Our main question is, What can be done using a polynomial number of these types of queries? That is, polynomial in the main parameters of the problem: n, m, and the number of bits t needed for representing a single value v i (S). Note that from an algorithmic point of view we are talking about sublinear time algorithms: the input size here really consists of up to n(2 m − 1) numbers-the descriptions of the valuation functions of all bidders. There are two aspects to computational efficiency in these settings: the first is the communication with the bidders, i.e., the number of queries made, and the second is the "usual" computational tractability. Our hardness results (lower bounds) will depend only on the number of queries-and hold independently of any computational assumptions like P = N P . Our positive results (upper bounds) will always be computationally efficient both in terms of the number of queries and in terms of regular computation. As mentioned, this paper concentrates on the single aspect of preference elicitation and on its computational consequences and does not address issues of incentives. We also do not address the important issue of the complexity of calculating the response for such a demand query, and we assume that it is tractable task for the users.
1 This strengthens our lower bounds, but means that the upper bounds also require evaluation from this perspective before being used in any real combinatorial auction.
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In a companion paper (see [7] ) we study similar questions for the more restricted natural case of ascending-price combinatorial auctions. 1 Environments where realizing preferences are costly are discussed, e.g., in [30, 42] . 2 We do observe, however, that some weak incentive property comes for free in demand-query auctions, since "myopic" players will answer all demand queries truthfully; i.e., if bidders consider only the (tentative) allocation decision at the current price level, they will have no incentive to misreport their true demand. We also note that in some cases the incentives issues can be handled orthogonally to the preference elicitation issues. For example, one can use Vickrey-Clarke-Groves prices (e.g., [2, 41] ) when the socially-optimal solution is chosen; this will not always work, since such general schemes do not always exist, e.g., for approximate solutions or for objective functions other than welfare maximization and when calculating the appropriate prices requires additional information (see [20] ). 1.1. Extant work. Many iterative combinatorial auction mechanisms rely on demand queries (see the survey in [43] ). For our purposes, two families of auctions serve as the main motivating starting points: the first is the ascending item-price auctions of [27, 14, 24] that with computational efficiency find an optimal allocation among "(gross) substitutes" valuations, 3 and the second is the ascending bundle-price auctions of [41, 1] that find an optimal allocation among general valuations-but not necessarily with computational efficiency. 4 The main lower bound in this area, due to [37] , states that, indeed, due to inherent communication requirements, it is impossible for any iterative auction to find the optimal allocation among general valuations with subexponentially many queries. A similar exponential lower bound was shown by [37] also for even approximating the optimal allocation to within a factor of m 1/2− for every > 0. Several lower bounds and upper bounds for approximation are known for some natural classes of valuations-these are summarized in Table 1 .
In [37] , the universal generality of demand queries is also shown: any nondeterministic communication protocol for finding an allocation that optimizes the social welfare can be converted into one that uses only demand queries (with bundle prices). In [47] this was generalized also to nondeterministic protocols for finding allocations that satisfy other natural types of economic requirements (e.g., approximate social efficiency, envy-freeness). However, in [36] it was demonstrated that this "completeness" of demand queries holds only in the nondeterministic setting, while in the usual deterministic setting, demand queries (even with bundle prices) may be exponentially weaker than general communication. In particular, [36] construct a set of preferences for which the optimal allocation can be computed with little communication, but an exponential number of demand queries are required for this task. Note that this comes in contrast to results in this paper, where a polynomial number of demand queries can simulate queries that are natural from an economic or an algorithmic perspective (see section 4).
A closely related line of research draws connections between computational learning theory and preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. Some of these papers appeared prior, or in parallel, to this work (e.g., [48, 10, 29, 46] ). These works iden-tified similarities between value and demand queries and some common queries in learning theory, and presented some elegant distinctions between the power of value queries, item-price demand queries, and bundle-price demand queries. We will discuss some of these results later in this paper. Another important contribution of these papers and some other papers (e.g., [28] ) is in discussing scenarios where the complexity of the auction is parameterized in terms of the minimal representation of the underlying bidding language. This research led to several positive results about the power of bundle-price demand queries, also showing a separation between the power of such queries of polynomial size and item-price demand queries. These issues will be discussed in more details in section 6 and throughout the paper.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: First, in section 2, we present an informal exposition that describes our new results and their context. Section 3 describes our model. In section 4 we discuss the power of different types of queries, and section 5 studies the approximability of the social welfare with a polynomial number of queries. Finally, section 6 compares the power of item-price demand queries to the power of demand queries that use bundle prices, focusing on the representation of bundle-price demand queries.
2.
A survey of our results.
Comparison of query types.
We first ask what other natural types of queries we could imagine iterative auctions using. Here is a list of such queries that are either natural, have been used in the literature, or that we have found useful.
1. Value query: The auctioneer presents a bundle S, and the bidder reports his value v(S) for this bundle.
Marginal-value query:
The auctioneer presents a bundle A and an item j, and the bidder reports how much he is willing to pay for j, given that he already owns A, i.e.,
Demand query (with item prices):
The auctioneer presents a vector of item prices p 1 , . . . , p m ; the bidder reports his demand under these prices, i.e., some set S that maximizes v(S) − i∈S p i . 
Indirect-utility query:
The auctioneer presents a set of item prices p 1 , . . . , p m , and the bidder responds with his "indirect-utility" under these prices, that is, the highest utility he can achieve from a bundle under these prices: max S⊆M (v(S) − i∈S p i ). 
5.
Relative-demand query: the auctioneer presents a set of nonzero prices p 1 , . . . , p m , and the bidder reports the bundle that maximizes his value per unit of money, i.e., some set that maximizes
i∈S pi . We apply this type of query, for example, in the design of the approximation algorithm described in Figure 1 in section 5. In particular, this shows that demand queries can elicit all information about a valuation by simulating all 2 m −1 value queries. We also observe that value queries and marginal-value queries can simulate each other in polynomial time and that demand queries and indirect-utility queries can also simulate each other in polynomial time. We prove that exponentially many value queries may be needed in order to simulate a single demand query. 
Welfare approximation.
The next question that we ask is, How well can a computationally efficient auction that uses only demand queries approximate the optimal allocation? Two separate obstacles are known: In [37] , a lower bound of min(n, m 1/2− ), for any fixed > 0, was shown for the approximation factor obtained using any polynomial amount of communication. A computational bound with the same value applies even for the case of single-minded bidders under the assumption of N P = P [44, 32, 49] . As noted in [37] , the computationally efficient greedy algorithm of [32] can be adapted to become a polynomial-time iterative auction that achieves a nearly matching approximation factor of min(n, O( √ m)). This iterative auction may be implemented with bundle-price demand queries but, as far as we see, not as one with item prices. Since in a single bundle-price demand query an exponential number of prices can be presented, this algorithm can have an exponential communication cost. In section 5, we describe a different item-price auction that achieves, for the first time, the same approximation factor with a polynomial number of demand queries (and thus polynomial communication).
Theorem (Theorem 1, section 5). There exists a computationally efficient iterative auction with item-price demand queries that finds an allocation that approximates the optimal welfare between arbitrary valuations to within a factor of min(n, O( √ m)). One may then attempt to obtain such an approximation factor using iterative auctions that use only the weaker value queries. However, we show that this is impossible:
Theorem (Theorem 2, section 5). Any iterative auction that uses a polynomial (in n and m) number of value queries cannot achieve an approximation factor that is better than O( m log m ). Note, however, that auctions with only value queries are not completely trivial in power: the bundling auctions of [26] can easily be implemented by a polynomial number of value queries and can achieve an approximation factor of O(
) by using O(log m) equisized bundles. We do not know how to close the (tiny) gap between this upper bound and our lower bound. Table 2 summarizes these upper and lower bounds.
Representing bundle prices.
The different pricing methods for iterative combinatorial auctions generate much debate among auction designers, both in theory and in practice. One prominent example is the design of spectrum auctions by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the US. The final part of our paper compares the power of item prices and bundle prices. It is straightforward to see that bundle-price demand queries are a generalization of item-price queries; we also observe that existing results actually imply that bundle-price queries are more powerful than item-price queries, since an exponential number of item-price queries may be required for simulating a bundle-price demand query. As we shall see, the latter observation is not delicate enough, and one should not reach strict conclusions when comparing the two query types. This can be shown by dealing with a critical issue with bundle-price auctions that was side-stepped by our model, as well as by most previous work that used bundle-price auctions: how are the bundle prices represented?
For item-price auctions this is not an issue, since a query needs only to specify a small number m of prices. In bundle-price auctions that situation is more difficult, since there are exponentially many bundles that require pricing. Our basic model (like most previous work that used bundle prices, e.g., [1] ) ignores this issue and requires only that the prices be determined, somehow, by the protocol. 10 A finer model would fix a specific language for denoting bundle prices, force the protocol to represent the bundle prices in this language, and require that the representations of the bundle prices also be polynomial.
What could such a language for denoting prices for all bundles look like? First, note that specifying a price for each bundle is equivalent to specifying a valuation. Second, as noted in [40] , most of the proposed bidding languages are really just languages for representing valuations, i.e., a syntactic representation of valuations-thus we could use any of them. This point of view opens up the general issue of which language should be used in bundle-price auctions and what are the implications of this choice.
Here we initiate this line of investigation. We consider bundle-price auctions where the prices must be given as an XOR-bid, i.e., the protocol must explicitly indicate the price of every bundle whose value is different than that of all of its proper subsets. Note that all bundle-price auctions that do not explicitly specify a bidding language must implicitly use this language or a weaker one, since without a specific language one would need to list prices for all bundles, except perhaps for trivial ones (those with value 0 or, more generally, those with a value that is determined by one of their proper subsets.) We show that once the representation length of bundle prices is taken into account (using the XOR-language), bundle-price auctions are no longer strictly stronger than item-price auctions. Our proof relies on the sophisticated known lower bounds for constant depth circuits due to Håstad [25] . We were not able to find an elementary proof.
Define the cost of an iterative auction as the total length of the queries and answers used throughout the auction (in the worst case).
Theorem (Theorem 3, section 6). For some profile of valuations, bundle-price auctions that use the XOR-language require an exponential cost for finding the optimal allocation. In contrast, item-price auctions can find the optimal allocation for this class within polynomial cost.
This puts doubts on the applicability of bundle-price auctions like [1, 41] , and it may justify the use of "hybrid" pricing methods such as Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom's clock-proxy auction (see [12] ) that starts as an item-price auction but ultimately runs a sealed-bid bundle-price "proxy" auction. However, like most worst-case results, we prove this result for the stylized class of valuations that we construct. One should take into account that a tradeoff exists between this communication problem and the fact that bundle prices might allow reaching a more efficient outcome in many natural settings. 
A valuation is called a k-bundle XOR if it can be represented as an XOR combination of (at most) k atomic bids [38] , i.e., if there are at most k bundles S j and prices
11 As mentioned, this is the standard method to represent general valuations. A discussion on this representation language and other natural languages can be found in [40] .
Iterative auctions.
The auctioneer sets up a protocol (equivalently an "algorithm"), where at each stage of the protocol some information q-termed the "query"-is sent to some bidder i and then bidder i replies with some reply that depends on the query as well as on his own valuation. In this paper, we assume that we have complete control over the bidders' behavior, and thus the protocol also defines a reply function r i (q, v i ) that specifies bidder i's reply to query q. In general, the term iterative auction refers to any interactive protocol of such form, but it is natural to have restrictions on the set of allowed queries. For example, one may study an iterative auction that uses only value queries, only demand queries, or both. The most studied family of iterative auctions is ascending-price auctions, that are actually iterative auctions that use only demand queries but have the additional restriction that prices presented to bidders cannot decrease over time. This paper studies the power of iterative auctions that use only demand queries whose prices are not necessarily ascending, and we compare such auctions to auctions that use other types of queries. Note that the protocol may be adaptive: the query value as well as the queried bidder may depend on the replies received for past queries. At the end of the protocol, an allocation S 1 , . . . , S n must be declared, where
To summarize, combinatorial iterative auctions are protocols where the auctioneer publishes a series of queries (taken from a collection of allowed series of queries), and the outcome of the protocol is an allocation that is determined based on all the queries and the responses to them.
We say that the auction finds an optimal allocation if it finds the allocation that maximizes the social welfare i v i (S i ) over all possible allocations S 1 , . . . , S n . We say that it finds a c-approximation
. . , T n is an optimal allocation. The running time of the auction on a given instance of the bidders' valuations is the total number of queries made on this instance. The running time of a protocol is the worst case cost over all instances. Note that we impose no computational limitations on the protocol or on the players. 12 This of course only strengthens our hardness results. Yet, our positive results will not use this power and will be efficient also in the usual computational sense.
Our goal will be to design computationally efficient protocols. We will deem a protocol computationally efficient if its cost is polynomial in the relevant parameters: the number of bidders n, the number of items m, and t. Note that all of our results give concrete bounds, where the dependence on the parameters is given explicitly; we use the standard Big-Oh notation just as a shorthand.
Demand queries.
Most of the paper will be concerned with a common special case of iterative auctions in which the queries that are sent to bidders are demand queries: the query specifies a price p(S) ∈ + for each bundle S. The reply of bidder i is simply the set most desired-"demanded"-under these prices. Formally, bidder i replies with a set S that maximizes v i (S) − p(S). It may happen that more than one set S maximizes this value. In this case, ties are broken according to some fixed tie-breaking rule, e.g., the lexicographically first such set is returned. All of our results hold for any fixed tie-breaking rule.
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Note that even though in our model valuations are integral, we allow the demand query to use arbitrary real numbers. A practical issue here is how will the query be specified: in the general case, an exponential number of prices need to be sent in a single query. Formally, this is not a problem, as the model does not limit the length of queries in any way-the protocol must simply define what the prices are in terms of the replies received for previous queries. We look into this issue further in section 6.
Many auctions in the literature restrict the prices' representation to item prices (or linear prices).
Definition 1 (Item Prices). The prices in each query are given by prices p j for each item j. The price of a set S is additive: p(S) = j∈S p j .
The power of different types of queries.
In this section, we compare the power of the various types of queries defined in the introduction. We will present computationally efficient simulations of these query types using item-price demand queries. On the other hand, we show that an exponential number of some of these queries may be needed for simulating demand queries. Table 3 summarizes the relations between the different query types. Some parts of the following lemmas are elementary, and some are harder. These lemmas will be used in the analysis in the rest of this paper. All missing proofs can be found in Appendix A. 12 The running time really measures communication costs and not computational running time. 13 Much of the previous work on combinatorial auctions assumed that bidders respond with all the bundles in their demand sets. This can imply communicating an exponential number of bundles at a single step. All our results hold for this definition of demand queries (except Lemma 4, where it is clear that simulating such queries is a harder task). In order to measure the total communication rather than the number of queries, we assume that bidders report a single bundle at each step, and our results hold even for this less expressive query. 14 As a direct corollary, we get that demand auctions can always fully elicit the bidders' valuations by simulating all possible 2 m − 1 queries and thus elicit enough information for determining the optimal allocation. Note, however, that this elicitation may be computationally inefficient.
The next lemma shows that demand queries can be exponentially more powerful than value queries.
Lemma 3. An exponential number of value queries may be required for simulating a single demand query.
Proof. We will actually show an example where a single demand query suffices for finding the optimal allocation, but an exponential number of value queries are required. Consider a player with a valuation of 2|S| for any bundle S, except for some "hidden" bundle H of size m 2 with a valuation of 2|S| + 2, and a second player with a known valuation of 2|S| + 1 for every bundle S. The only optimal allocation gives the hidden set H to the first bidder. In a demand query with a price of 2+ for every item, the first bidder demands his "hidden" set and thus reveals the optimal allocation.
However, consider any algorithm that uses only value queries. An adversary will answer each value query v(S) to the first bidder with v(S) = 2|S|. As long as two sets S of size m 2 have not been queried, any of them can be the hidden set H, and the optimal allocation cannot be determined. Thus, Ω(2 m ) value queries will be needed in the worst case.
Indirect utility queries are, however, equivalent in power to demand queries. According to our definition of relative-demand queries, they clearly cannot simulate even value queries. Consider, for example, two bidders 1 and 2, where for every bundle S, v 2 (S) = c · v 1 (S) for some c > 0. It is straightforward from the definition 14 Note that t bundle-price demand queries can easily simulate a value query by setting the prices of all the bundles except S (the bundle with the unknown value) to be L and performing a binary search on the price of S.
15 Note: although in our model values are integral, we allow the query prices to be arbitrary real numbers; thus we may have bundles with arbitrarily close relative demands. In this sense the simulation above is only up to any given (and the number of queries is O(log L + log 1 )). When the relative-demand query prices are given as rational numbers, exact simulation is implied when log is linear in the input length.
of relative-demand queries that the responses of the two bidders to such queries will always be identical, although they have different values, so no value query can be simulated by a relative-demand query. This is the reason why the lower row in Table  3 is empty.
5.
Approximating the social welfare with value and demand queries. We know from [37] that iterative combinatorial auctions that use only a polynomial number of queries (of any kind) cannot find an optimal allocation among general valuations and, in fact, cannot even approximate it to within a factor better than min{n, m 1/2− }. Can such an approximation ratio be attained using demand queries, or even using the weaker value queries? In this section, we show that this lower bound can be matched using demand queries, while value queries can only do much worse. Figure 1 describes a polynomial-time algorithm that achieves a min(n, O( √ m)) approximation ratio. This algorithm greedily picks the bundles that maximize the bidders' per-item value (using "relative-demand" queries; see Lemma 5) . As a final step, it allocates all the items to a single bidder if it improves the social welfare (this can be checked using value queries). Since both value queries and relative-demand queries can be simulated by a polynomial number of demand queries with item prices (Lemmas 2 and 5), this algorithm can be implemented by a polynomial number of demand queries with item prices. Theorem 1. The auction described in Figure 1 can be implemented by a polynomial number of demand queries and achieves a min{n, 4 √ m}-approximation for the social welfare.
Proof. We first observe that the algorithm can be implemented by a polynomial number of value queries and relative demand queries: querying a bidder for the bundle that maximizes his per-item value is a relative-demand query when all the item prices are 1, and revealing the value of this bundle requires one value query. Querying a bidder for his value for all items can be done by an additional value query. Each bidder is thus asked at most m relative-demand queries and exactly two value queries.
Next, we prove that the algorithm achieves an approximation ratio of at least min{n, 4 √ m}. The algorithm will clearly achieve a 
Repeat until T = ∅ or K = ∅:
Ask each bidder i in K for the bundle Si that maximizes her per-item value, i.e., Si ∈ arg max S⊆T v i (S) |S| . Let i be the bidder with the maximal per-item value, i.e., i ∈ arg maxi∈K If allocating all the items to some bidder i improves the social welfare achieved so far (i.e., ∃i ∈ N such that vi(M ) > i∈N vi(S * i )), then allocate all items to this bidder i. 
n}).
Let ALG be the allocation found by the algorithm, and let v(OP T ) and v(ALG) be the optimal welfare and the welfare achieved by the algorithm, respectively. First, we analyze cases where "large" bundles contribute most of the optimal welfare, i.e.,
where the first inequality holds since
) and the second holds since the last stage of the algorithm verifies that the welfare achieved by the algorithm is at least the valuation of every player for the whole bundle M . The last inequality holds, since there are no more than √ m bundles of size of at least √ m. The analysis of the case where "small" bundles contribute most of the optimal welfare (i.e.,
. . , k} be the set of bidders that receives a "small" bundle (i.e., bundles in {T 1 , . . . , T k }) in OP T that does not intersect any bundle in ALG. Consider the following sum:
In the two claims below, we show that each of the summands in the right side of (5.
1) is not greater than v(ALG). This immediately implies that
Since most of the optimal welfare is contributed by "small" bundles,
What is left to be proved is that both summands in (5.1) are not greater than v(ALG).
Consider a bidder i that receives a small bundle T i in OP T such that T i is disjoint from all bundles in ALG. We observe that this bidder surely receives a nonempty bundle S i in ALG. This holds since the items in T i are not allocated at the end of the algorithm (they are not in any bundle in ALG), but player i has a nonzero value for T i .
Since the algorithm picked some S i ∈ ALG and not T i for bidder i, 
where the second leftmost inequality holds since bidder j = F (i) demands S j ∈ ALG when all the items in T i are still on sale and the third inequality holds since each S j intersects at most
We showed before how the theorem follows from these two claims. We now ask, How well can the optimal welfare be approximated by a polynomial number of value queries? First we note that value queries are not completely powerless: In [26] it is shown that if the m items are split into k fixed bundles of size m/k each and these fixed bundles are auctioned as though each was indivisible, then the social welfare generated by such an auction is at least an
-approximation of that possible in the original auction. Notice that such an auction can be implemented by 2 k − 1 value queries to each bidder-querying the value of each bundle of the fixed bundles. Thus, if we choose k = log m bundles, we get an m √ log m -approximation while still using a polynomial number of queries.
We show that not much more is possible using value queries. Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 6: achieving any approximation ratio k which is asymptotically greater than m log m , i.e., ω( m log m ), requires by Lemma 6 at least 2 ω(log m) queries which are exponential in m. We conclude this section by mentioning that demand queries have one additional strong property: they allow solving the linear program for combinatorial auctions in polynomial time. The winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions may be formulated as an integer program. In many cases solving the linear-program relaxation of this integer program is useful: for some restricted classes of valuations, it finds the optimum of the integer program (e.g., substitute valuations [27, 24] ) or helps approximating the optimum (e.g., [16, 18, 6, 22, 21] ). It turns out that by asking the players a polynomial number of demand queries, this linear program can be solved in polynomial time despite having an exponential number of variables. This was first observed by Nisan and Segal [37] , and a more detailed analysis can be found in [9] and also in a preliminary version of this manuscript [8] .
Lemma 6. Any iterative auction that uses only value queries and distinguishes between k-tuples
6. Demand queries with bundle prices. In previous sections, we argued that item-price demand queries are powerful: they can simulate other natural types of queries, they can achieve the best tractable approximation ratio, they do much better than value queries, etc. Nevertheless, item-price queries are known to be limited in their expressiveness. One notable weakness of item prices relates to the existence of a competitive equilibrium. A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices and an allocation, such that each bidder is allocated his most desirable bundle under these prices, and all the items are allocated; such allocations are always socially optimal. With item prices, competitive equilibria always exist for the restricted family of substitutes valuations (see [27] and Definition 3 in Appendix B), but do not exist for practically any wider preferences domain (see, e.g., [34, 5] ). One important consequence of this fact is that one cannot hope to design such an iterative process that will end up in a competitive equilibrium for all valuations. In particular, auctions that belong to the common and natural family of ascending price auctions cannot determine the optimal allocation by converging to such an equilibrium. 16 Interestingly, these expressiveness issues are solved when the auctioneer is allowed to use bundle-price demand queries: the seller publishes prices for every bundle, and the bidders respond with their demand under the published prices. With bundle prices, a competitive equilibrium always exists (see, e.g., [41, 9] ), and there are ascending-price iterative auctions that converge to such competitive equilibria, e.g., [41, 1] . In this section, we study the connection between item-price auctions and bundle-price auctions. On one hand, it is straightforward to see that bundleprice demand queries are more powerful than item-price demand queries. On the other hand, when one carefully analyzes the representation of bundle-price demand queries, this conclusion no longer holds. Consequently, bundle-price demand queries and item-price queries can be regarded as incomparable in their power.
Bundle prices are exponentially more powerful than item prices.
Without taking into account any representational issues, it is easy to see that bundleprice queries are at least as powerful as item-price queries, and in some settings they are better by an exponential factor. The first claim is trivial, and the latter follows, for example, from results by Lahaie and Parkes [29] and Blum et al. [10] . in m) .
Proof. The first statement is trivial: we can simulate any demand query with the item prices p 1 , . . . , p m by a bundle-price query with p(S) = i∈S p i .
The second statement follows from two existing results: Lahaie and Parkes [29] devise a bundle-price auction that always computes the optimal allocation using a polynomial number of bundle-price demand queries for bidders with k-XOR valuations 17 whenever k is polynomial. In contrast, [10] show that there exist valuations that are XORs of k = √ m bundles such that any item-price auction that finds an optimal allocation requires exponentially many queries.
It is worth mentioning that although bundle-price queries may save much communication compared to item-price demand queries, existing hardness results still apply. In particular, an exponential number of polynomial-sized bundle-price demand queries is required in the worst case for computing a good approximation to the optimal social welfare for general valuations [36] .
On the representation of bundle-price demand queries.
Although bundle-price queries generalize item-price queries, a single bundle-price demand query can use an exponential number of prices, which is clearly impractical. One may try solving this communication problem by some clever compact representation of the bundle prices; however, the representation of bundle-price auctions is implicit in most of the existing literature.
In this section, we explicitly fix the language in which bundle prices are presented to the bidders in bundle-price auctions. This language requires the algorithm to explicitly list the price of every bundle with a nontrivial price. "Trivial" in this context is a price that is equal to that of one of its proper subsets (which was listed explicitly). This representation is equivalent to the XOR-language for expressing valuations. Formally, each query q is given by an expression:
In this representation, the price demanded for every set S is simply p(S) = max {k=1,...,l|S k ⊆S} p k .
Definition 2. The length of the query q = (S 1 : Note that under this definition, bundle-price auctions are not necessarily stronger than item-price auctions. An item-price query that prices each item at 1 is translated to an exponentially long bundle-price query that needs to specify the price |S| for each bundle S. But perhaps bundle-price auctions can still find optimal allocations whenever item-price auctions can, without directly simulating such queries? We show that this is not the case: indeed, when the representation length is taken into account, bundle-price auctions can be seriously inferior to item-price auctions.
Consider the following family of valuations: Each item is valued at 3, except that for some single set S, its value is a bit more: 3|S| + b, where b ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Note that an item-price auction can easily find the optimal allocation between any two such valuations: Set the prices of each item to 3 + ; if the demand sets of the two players are both empty, then b = 0 for both valuations, and an arbitrary allocation is fine. If one of them is empty and the other nonempty, allocate the nonempty demand set to its bidder and the rest to the other. If both demand sets are nonempty, then, unless they form an exact partition, we need to see which b is larger, which we can do by increasing the price of a single item in each demand set.
We will show that any bundle-price auction that uses only the XOR-language to describe bundle prices requires an exponential communication cost (which includes the sum of all description lengths of prices) to find an optimal allocation between any two such valuations.
The complication in the proof stems from the fact that, using XOR-expressions, the length of the price description depends on the number of bundles whose price is strictly larger than each of their subsets-this may be significantly smaller than the number of bundles that have a nonzero price. (The proof becomes easy if we require the protocol to explicitly name every bundle with a nonzero price.) We do not know of any elementary proof for this lemma (although we believe that one can be found). Instead, we reduce the problem to a well-known lower bound in boolean circuit complexity [25] , stating that boolean circuits of depth 3 that compute the majority function on m variables require 2
Lemma 7. Every bundle-price auction that uses XOR-expressions to denote bundle prices requires a communication cost of 2

Ω(
√ m) in order to find the optimal allocation among two valuations from the above family.
Proof. Consider the protocol running on the following two valuations: the first has b = 0 (i.e., is simply additive), and the second has b = 1 for the set S of all items. In this case the outcome must be to allocate all to the second bidder. Let e 1 , . . . , e t be the queries made on this input, where each
. Now consider what happens when the first valuation is changed so that for some S of size exactly m/2, we get a bonus b = 2-clearly the allocation must change so that this S is allocated to the first player-hence one of the queries e 1 , . . . , e t must change its answer. We will see that the fact that this is true for every such S implies that t i=1 l i is exponential. First note that if in e i there exists some set of size m/2+1 that has price zero, then the answer will not change, as this set will give a social welfare of at least 3m/2 + 3 as opposed to at most 3m/2 + 2 that S gives. Let us focus on an e i that does not have such a set. We build a boolean DNF (disjunctive normal form) formula from this expression as follows: the variable set will be x 1 , . . . , x m -a variable for each item. Consider a term (atomic bid) E ) in e i , we build a conjunction of the variables in it (ignoring the price for this bundle). We then take the disjunction of all of these conjunctions. First notice that this DNF must accept all inputs with more than m/2 1's in the input-since otherwise we consider a set that is not accepted by this expression, and the value of this set in e i must be zero. Now notice that if an input with 1's in the set S of size exactly m/2 is accepted by this formula, then the answer to query e i will not change. The reason is that an accepted set S contains some essential bundle B j i , and thus its price in e i would be at least p j i . However, since the bundle is essential, there exists some set of size m/2 + 1 that is priced at exactly p j i -this set would clearly be preferable to S-the only set whose value has changed. Since for every set S of size exactly m/2, the answer to one of the queries must change, at least one of the formulas constructed must reject the input with 1's exactly in S.
We now take the conjunction of all boolean expressions built for all i. This formula accepts all inputs with exactly m/2+1 1's, and rejects all inputs with exactly m/2 1's. Note that this formula is a conjunction of disjunctions of conjunctions of variables-a so-called monotone depth 3 formula. Since it is a monotone formula, it computes the majority function. Its size is clearly bounded from above by the total length of all expressions e i . We are now ready to invoke the well-known lower bound by Håstad [25] that states that a depth 3 formula for majority must have size at least 2
The following theorem follows immediately from the above lemma. Theorem 3. There are classes of valuations for which the optimal allocation can be determined by a polynomial number of item-price demand queries, but this task requires exponential communication cost when using bundle-price demand queries in XOR representation.
Conclusions and future work.
Much work has been going on since the first version of this paper was published. Several papers presented approximate iterative auctions for combinatorial auctions that use demand queries. For general valuations, two papers presented randomized algorithms that achieve the same O( √ m) approximation for the social welfare as our algorithm does, but also in an incentive compatible manner. Lavi and Swamy [31] presented a general method to convert algorithms to dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanisms based on a randomized-rounding technique of the relevant linear program; their work resulted in an O( √ m) approximation that is incentive-compatible in expectation. Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira [17] presented a randomized O( √ m) approximation that is truthful for any coin flipping done by the algorithm. The most interesting open problem in this context is whether there exists a deterministic mechanism that achieves an O( √ m) approximation (like the one discussed in section 5) that is also incentive compatible.
More iterative auctions based on demand queries were recently designed for approximating the welfare in several subfamilies of subadditive valuations, e.g., [19, 22, 21] . Several gaps still exist between lower and upper bounds for these problems, and larger gaps exist between the approximation results and results that are known to be attainable by incentive-compatible algorithms. There are currently no results separating what can be achieved by incentive-compatible algorithms and unrestricted algorithms, and proving such a separation result is another important open problem. A recent survey [9] surveys the state-of-the-art approximation mechanism with demand queries, value queries, and with general communication. Interestingly, all these approximation results use item-price demand queries, and it is unknown whether there are natural algorithmic environments where other types of queries are optimal. ( [36] gave an artificial instance where demand queries are inferior to unrestricted communication protocols.)
Finally, this paper embarks on a discussion of the representation of bundle-price demand queries; queries that have become more popular in recent auction designs. We discussed the limitations of the most natural representation method-by XOR formulae. Lately, a few papers studied different bidding languages also in the con-text of price representation (e.g., [29, 28] ), but still focused on their role as bidding languages that represent bidder valuations rather than on their use for announcing prices. A more general and systematic analysis of languages especially designed for representing prices is still missing. Proof. We will show that demand queries can simulate any marginal value query v(j|S) using t queries and then invoke the previous lemma. Set the prices of all the items in S to zero and the prices of all other items (except j) to ∞. Then, we perform a binary search on p j to find its lowest value for which the bidder demands v(S). It is straightforward to see that this price is indeed the marginal value of item j: at this price, the utilities from the bundles S and S ∪ {j} are equal; thus v(S) − 0 = v(S ∪ {j}) − p j , and the claim follows.
Appendix
A binary search makes t demand queries, and m marginal value queries are needed to simulate a single value query; thus v(S) can be simulated by mt demand queries.
Lemma 4. An indirect-utility query can be simulated by mt + 1 demand queries. A demand query can be simulated by m + 1 indirect-utility queries.
Proof. An indirect-utility query with prices − → p can be answered by first querying for the demand D under these prices and then simulating the value query v(D).
The following algorithm uses m + 1 indirect-utility queries to simulate a demand query with some price vector − → p :
Initialization: Start with the price vector − → p for which the player answers some utility x.
Repeat : For every item i = 1, . . . , m, raise the price of item i by some ∈ (0, 1). If the answer to the indirect-utility query now is other than x, we decrease its price back by in all future queries. If the answer was x, we use the new price for i in all future queries.
Finally: After all the m + 1 indirect-utility queries are done, return the bundle of all items for which the answer was changed when we increased their prices.
In the algorithm above, if we raised the price of some item i and the reported maximal-utility did not change, then there would clearly be utility-maximizing bundles that do not contain i; thus we can ignore this item. If the maximal-utility changed, then any utility-maximizing bundle under the current prices clearly contains i; thus we include it in our answer. Leaving the price of item i (of the first kind) at p i + ensures that any bundle that contains it will not be output (but we are guaranteed to have other utility-maximizing bundles). 
